Appellate Court Reverses Disqualification of Entire Prosecutors’ Office in Crash Case
A Washington State appellate panel has overturned a Pierce County judge’s decision to remove the entire prosecuting attorney’s office from a criminal prosecution, ruling that a targeted screening of the involved deputy prosecutor sufficed to address potential conflicts.
In a decision issued July 14, 2026, Division Two of the Washington Court of Appeals in Tacoma concluded that Pierce County Superior Court Judge Phil Thornton exceeded his authority when he barred the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office from prosecuting Christopher Lynn Spanjer. The court determined that isolating the conflicted deputy prosecutor was adequate to safeguard fairness, without requiring the entire office to recuse itself.
The ruling, which is published and thus binding across the state, marks the first time a Washington appellate court has examined whether an entire prosecuting team must step back when one of its own deputy prosecutors suffers injury as a crime victim.
Collision during Traffic Stop Involves Prosecutor as Victim
The case stems from a September 10, 2024, incident in which Spanjer fled a traffic stop and struck a vehicle operated by Sean Plunkett, a deputy prosecutor assigned to the criminal division of the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office. Plunkett sustained injuries in the collision.
The following day, the office implemented a policy restricting Plunkett’s access to Spanjer’s case file. Six charges were filed against Spanjer on September 12, 2024, including unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle, failure to remain at the scene of an injury accident, attempting to elude police, driving under the influence, and related offenses.
In January 2025, after reviewing updated medical information about Plunkett’s condition, prosecutors amended the charging document to include vehicular assault—with Plunkett named as the victim. Deputy prosecutor Miriam Norman was assigned to lead the prosecution and had minimal prior contact with Plunkett before taking the case.
According to court records, Norman followed standard protocol in handling the matter, limiting her communications with Plunkett to official interactions similar to those she would have with any victim. Plunkett also affirmed he would not participate as a prosecutor in the case and had been effectively screened through existing office practices.
Court Agrees Office Must Step Back—Then Appellates Reverse
Spanjer filed a motion seeking disqualification of the entire prosecuting attorney’s office, contending that Plunkett’s position as both colleague and victim created a structural conflict. He argued that the Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly those governing witness-advocate roles, warranted full recusal to preserve public confidence in the fairness of the proceedings.
At a February 2025 hearing, Spanjer emphasized that Plunkett’s status as a colleague could subtly influence other prosecutors’ decision-making—potentially affecting charging strategies, plea negotiations, and sentencing recommendations. Judge Thornton granted the motion in an order dated June 16, 2025, citing concerns that Plunkett’s “colleagues likely have a vested interest in his wellbeing” and that such ties might skew the office’s impartiality.
The State appealed the disqualification, requesting discretionary review. While that appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals stayed the lower court’s order, and a court commissioner subsequently approved review of the ruling.
Following the scheduling of oral arguments, the defense and the prosecution reached a resolution. The defendant withdrew his previous objection regarding the handling of his case and entered a guilty plea.
Subsequently, the defense contended that this plea rendered the appeal moot. The appellate panel acknowledged that with no active prosecution remaining, effective relief was no longer available. However, the judges chose to address the core legal issues, invoking an exception to the mootness doctrine. They cited the need for a definitive ruling to guide public officials and noted the high probability that similar questions would arise in the future while remaining unresolved by the courts.
Ruling on Office Disqualification
In the majority opinion, Judge Bradley Maxa determined that the entire prosecuting agency did not need to be disqualified due to the personal conflict of interest held by one prosecutor or any potential conflicts held by his colleagues.
The state had already agreed that the specific prosecutor, who was both an alleged victim in one of the charges and a necessary witness, was personally barred from participating in the matter.
Nevertheless, the court ruled that based on precedents set by the Washington Supreme Court in *State v. Stenger* and *State v. Nickels*, when a deputy prosecutor is disqualified and effectively screened from the case, removing the entire office is "neither necessary nor wise." The panel found no evidence suggesting that the screening measures used to isolate the conflicted prosecutor were ineffective.
The court also referenced the 2006 amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct, which removed the automatic assumption that one government lawyer's conflict of interest is imputed to the entire office.
A disqualification of the whole office remains presumptively appropriate only in one specific scenario: when the elected chief prosecutor personally represented the defendant in the same case or a closely related matter. The panel noted this exception did not apply here, as there was no indication of a personal conflict for the elected Pierce County prosecutor.
The panel also dismissed the defendant's argument that every attorney in the office was conflicted simply by virtue of being a colleague to the disqualified prosecutor. Judge Maxa noted that the record indicated the two prosecutors were merely co-employees in a large office rather than close personal friends. Additionally, there was no actual evidence that the office treated the defendant's case differently, and the plea agreement itself suggested fair treatment.
The court further observed that the "appearance of fairness" doctrine, which the trial court had relied on in its oral ruling, does not apply to prosecutors performing executive duties like making charging decisions or negotiating plea bargains, according to the Supreme Court's decision in *State v. Finch*. Unlike judges, prosecutors are not required to be completely neutral and are allowed to be zealous in enforcing the law.
"We hold that the trial court erred in disqualifying the entire PCPAO in this case," Maxa wrote.
Procedural Details
Acting Chief Judge Erik Price and Judge Meng Li Che agreed with the opinion.
The state was represented on appeal by a Tacoma attorney from the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. The defendant was represented by a Seattle attorney.
Because the appeal was resolved before a final decision, the court’s ruling does not directly alter outcomes for Spanjer’s case, which concluded with a guilty plea. Still, as a formal, published decision, it now serves as authoritative direction for Washington’s trial courts whenever a prosecuting agency faces charges involving one of its own employees as the victim.
Earlier reporting outlined how the case emerged after Spanjer, a former county prosecutor, was accused in a domestic incident involving his spouse, who also worked in the same office. Though the matter was settled through a plea agreement, the appellate court proceeded to issue an opinion addressing the legal standards for prosecuting internal cases—a move meant to clarify procedures for future similar situations.
The opinion outlines specific steps prosecutors should follow when a colleague appears on the victim’s side of a case, including how conflicts of interest are assessed and disclosed. It also recommends formal review protocols to ensure consistency and transparency, particularly when the accused and the victim share departmental affiliations or reporting lines.
Under the new guidance, county prosecutorial offices must now consider assigning an independent attorney or special counsel in instances where internal dynamics might influence case handling. The ruling emphasizes early identification of potential bias, timely notification to involved parties, and documentation of decisions made throughout the prosecution process.
Courts across the state have discretion in applying these recommendations, but the published opinion gives judges a clear framework to reference during pretrial conferences or evidentiary hearings involving prosecutorial employees. Legal observers note this could influence how courts evaluate motions to disqualify prosecutors or to suppress evidence in cases where office affiliations play a notable role.